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III.

Statement of the Case
This is an appeal from the decision of the district court on review from a decision of a
hearing officer for ITD regarding an Administrati,'e License Suspension.
Party Reference
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "State" or "ITD" for the purposes
of this argument. Mr. Besaw is referred to by name.
Stangard for Review
In Druffell v. State Department of Transp0l1ation, 136 Id. 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002), the
Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the judicial reviews of
administrative proceedings, the Court stated:
"Under the IDAPA, the ITD's decision may be overturned only where its
findings: a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or e) are arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion. I.e. Section 67-5279(3).
At p. 855. See also Idaho Transportation Department v. Van Camp, 2011 WL 2086512 ([d. App.)
and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, Docket No. 39425-2011 Idaho Supreme
COUl1, June 29, 2012 Opinion.
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing
Officer that driving privi leges should be reinstated. The review of disputed issues of fact must be
confined to the agency record for judicial review. Idaho Code §67-5277. Idaho Code §67-5279(1)
sets out the scope of review. Bennett v. State ofIdaho, Department of Transportation, 147 Id. 141,
206 P.3d 505 (eL App. 2009). The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as
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to the weight of the evidence presented. Upon judIcial review of an administrative hearing officer's
order a Court may not set aside findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial
evidence on the Record as a whole" Idaho Code §67-5279(3)(d). Mahurin v. State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation. 140 Id. 65,99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also Gibbar v. State ofIdaho,
Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006).
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: " ... if the
agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded for further proceedings
as necessary." Idaho Code §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must
be affirmed, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's
authority, is made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantiai evidence, or is arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Departmer1!, 137 Id. 337,48
P.3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred
in a manner specified in Idaho Code §67 -5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been
prejudiced. Oibbar v. State ofIdaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Td. 937,155 P.3d 1176, (Id.
App. 2006). and Idaho Transportation Department v. Van Camp, supra.
A hearing pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative
regulation is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id.
164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011). At p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's
license.

See I.C. §§ 49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2).
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Transportation, 151 Idaho 659, 262 PJd. 1030 (2011).

IV.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding
On January 16,2011, George Besaw, Jr., was driving in Nez Perce County with a Class A
Idaho driver's license. R. at pp. 70 and 79. The arresting office was ISP Trooper JefTrey Talbott.
The arresting officer recorded his contact with the vehicle and the occupants. R. at p. 69. Video
Exhibit K. The Court can note the weather conditions from the video. It was cold, rainy and wet.
The officer could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle.
The driver identified himself as George 1. Besaw, Jr. R. at p. 75. After running a record's check,
the driver was requested to exit the vehicle to perform the standard sobriety evaluations. R. at p. 75.
Trooper Talbott was first certified as a breath testing specialist and operator on the Lifeloc
device in October of2008. He was re-certified in August 0[2010. R. at p. 295. He testified at the
time of the hearing that after his training in August of2010, new versions of SOPs were issued. R.
at p. 459. The current version was issued in November of 2010. R. at p. 459. He did not receive
any formal training on the new SOP that was issued in November of 20 1O. R. at p. 296. He could
not specifically point out the differences between the three SOPs, the one that he was trained on in
August of 2010, the one that was modified shortly after his training in August of 20 I 0, and the
November 2010 version of the SOP. R. at p. 296. The trooper indicated he had no involvement in
writing the SOP or other reference manuals generated by the ISP Forensic Services. R. at p. 297.
The trooper conducted the horizontal gaze nystagnus walk and tum and one leg stand in the
conditions showed on the video. R. at p. 75. See also video, Exhibit K. Mr. Besaw was arrested
after the field sobriety tests were completed. Video Time 02:3 1:01. He was placed in the back of
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the. trooper's car, handcuffed with his hands behind him with his feet in front of him. Video Time
02:33:54. The trooper read to him the Notice of Suspension. R. atpp. 70-71. Video Time 02:37: 15.
The trooper did not read the language that is in the bottom portion of the middle section of the
advisory, the language states as follows: "THIS SUSPENSION FOR F AlLURE OR REFUSAL OF
THE EVIDENTIARY TEST(S) IS SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED
BY THE COURT." See/listen to video, Exhibit K.
When the trooper read the advisory to Mr. Besaw, he did not give Mr. Besaw a copy of said
form and did not video the back seat of his vehicle where Mr. Besaw was seated until after breath
testing had been completed. R. at p. 307. See also video, Exhibit K. The trooper indicates he was
positioned outside the vehicle standing and bent over some of the time. R. at p.318. The trooper
was asked questions about Mr. Besaw and his CDL license and what he had advised Mr. Besaw
regarding the license suspension for a Class A license. R. at pp. 308-310,313. The trooper was
asked the following questions:
"Okay. And as far as your trall1ll1g goes, you're required to read the
information that's set out in the suspension advisory section. Is that right?
Answer: The middle section, yes.
Question: Okay. And if you don't read all of that, then you violated your
training with regard to advises them of all the information that's noted either
in the refusal statute or the ALS statute?
Answer: Yes, I have to read the middle section."

R. at p. 3 I 3, LL. 17-25.
During the IS-minute observation period, while the trooper was standing outside his vehicle
with Mr. Besaw handcuffed with his hands behind him and feet forward, the trooper had to deal with
the window wipers going, the noise of21 51 Street, the interruption of Lewiston police officers on two
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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ditTerent occasions and his discussion with those police officers regarding the new advisory form and
directing them to retrieve the new advisory form from the front seat of his vehicle. Exhibit K, R. at
pp. 3] 6-318. The trooper had to deal with one of the passengers getting out of the vehicle and
coming towards the trooper's vehicle. Video Time 02:53: 13 - 02:53:41. R. at p. 319. The trooper
had to deal with the wife of the other passenger coming forward to the vehicle after exiting her car
which she drove to the China Inn parking lot. Video Time 02:55:32 - 02:55:58. Exhibit K, R. at
p.320. The trooper indicated that he made eye contact with the Lewiston polIce officers, and he
could not guarantee that he was bent over the whole I5-minute observation period. Video Time
02:46:40. R. at pp. 31-33. The trooper indicated that he had to yell at the passenger to stay at the
vehicle. Video Time 02:53:] 3. R. at p.319, IL. ] -2. The passenger did not follow this instruction.
These actions occurred during the 15 minute observation period.
During the hearing, the trooper could not remember the sequence of events because he had
not reviewed the video in preparation for the hearing.

R. at p. 319.

During the 15 minute

observation period, the trooper would have been talking on his radio to dispatch. The trooper
indicated that while he was on patrol, he would listen to radio stations. He was asked the £Jllowing
questions:
"Okay. And you were also - - it sounded, to me, like you had a radio playing
in your - - in your vehicle?
Answer: I normally have the radio started at the beginning of a traffic stop.
Question: Your normal - - you have it started? Is that what you said?
Answer: I'm normally playing the radio during the beginning of a traffic stop.
I normally drive ahead listening to the radio.
Question: Okay. And so during the course of time when my client was
blowing on the Lifeloc, there was the radio playing in your dispatch radio was
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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m use. Am I wrong in that?
Answer: Again, I didn't review the video. I don't know."
R. at p. 328, LL. 11-23.
During the course of the 15-minute observation period, the trooper would have been dealing
with the rain, the traffic noise, the window wiper sounds, the Lewiston police officers, dispatch, his
radio playing, the passenger approaching the vehicle, the wife of the passenger approaching the
vehicle, having eye contact with the individuals that approached him, and speaking with them with
Mr. Besaw sitting in the back of the trooper's vehicle without the interior video recorder recording
the breath test or the giving of the advisory. The breath test result was a .219, insufficient, .201. R.
at p. 72. First breath sample Video Time 02:52:55 - 02:53:06, second breath sample Video Time
02:55:24 - 02:55:31, third breath sample Video Time 02:57:39 - 02:57:48.
The November, 2010, SOP requires a .20 performance verification for breath tests over .20.
R. at p. 464. SOP, section 5.1.3 states:
"A performance verification of the Alca sensor and Lifeloc FC20 instruments using
a .08 or a .20 performance verification must be performed within twenty four hours,
before or after a evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath
alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1
for clarification on the use of the .20 solution in this capacity."
Section 5.1.4 states:
"A .20 performance verification should be run and results logged once every

calendar month and replaced with the fresh solution approximately every
twenty five verification or until i1 reaehes its expiration date, which ever
comes first.
NOTE: The .20 performance verification was implemented for the sole
purpose of supporting the instrument results of a 18-8004 C charge. Failure
to timely perform a .20 performance verification will not invalidate tests
performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other than 18-8004
C."
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Section 5.1.4.1 states: "The .20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification within twenty four hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level.
The .20 performance verification solution should be not used routinely for this purpose."
The instrument log sheet for the unit used on I\1r. Besaw notes that a performance verification
was done at 4:27 a.m. on January 16, 2011, using the .08 solution with test results of .073, lot
number 10802, bottle 0353. R. at p. 73. Mr. Besaw was arrested and charged with an excessive
DUI.
E-mail exchanges regarding the changes in the SOP were admitted into evidence. SeeR. at
pp.135-164.
A telephone hearing was set for February 8, 2011. R. at p. 184. The hearing officer issued
his decision on March 4, 2011. R. at p. 203. The hearing officer's decision was not issued within
thirty days of the temporary permit expiring. R. at p. 70. See IDAPA Rule 39.02.72.600.c)1. As
of May 1,2011, this provision was removed from the IDAPA Rules by the lTD. R. at p. 371.
Because the decision was not reached within the time frame noted, the driver requested two stays
from the hearing officer which were not granted even though such stays have been issued in other
cases. R. at pp. 192, 197,228. The hearing officer specifically indicated in each order denying stay
that he would issue Findings and Conclusions prior to the expiration of the thirty day temporary
permit. See R. at p. 201. He failed to issue such a decision in a timely fashion. The decision was
signed on March 4,2011. R. at p. 302. The temporary license terminated on February IS, 2011.
As a result of the hearing officer's decision, judicial review was requested. R. at pp. 223,
238. As a result of the Department's failure to send a complete record an order was entered by the
Court requiring a supplementing of the administrative record with all matters that the hearing officer
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took judicial notice of. R. at p. 352. The Court can note that the hearing officer took judicial notice
of the Idaho IDAPA rules that did not take effect until May 1,2011. R. at pp. 367-372. The District
Court heard oral argument on January 3, 2012, and issued its decision on February 9, 2012. R. at
p. 905. The decision upheld the hearing officer's order to suspend. This appeal followed.
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v.
Issues Presented on Appeal

(a)

Do ISP standards fail to comply with the requirements of I.e. § 18-8004(4)?

(b)

Did the trooper fail to comply with the SOP requirement of a 0.20 solution
performance verification?

(c)

Was a 15 minute observation period properly conducted?

(d)

Did the arresting officer misinform Besaw ofthe consequences of his license
suspension?

(e)

Did the ALS proceeding violate Besaw's due process rights?

(0

Did the State fail to comply with l.R.C.P., Rule 84?
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VI.
Argument
A.

DO ISP STANDARDS FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF I.e. § 18-8004(4) THUS A VIOLATION
OF I.e. §18-8002A(7)?
When interpreting a statute or a rule, it has to be construed as a whole to get the intent of the
Legislature or promulgating entity. A reviewing court has to use the literal words of the rule and the
words should be given their plain, obvious and rational meaning. In Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation
Department, 148 Id. 378,223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2(09), the Court interpreted the use of the word
"should" from the SOP in place at the time. One would have to believe that with the e-mails that
are part of Mr. Besaw's record, the Court of Appeals would have determined that the use of the word
"should" was just a "wiggle" word to get around any mandatory requirement or scientific standard.
R. at pp. 135-164.
In Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion in Wheeler, supra, she commented on the fact that ISP
had not formally promulgated administrative rules prescribing testing equipment or requirements for
its maintenance and operation. There has never been noted any appellate decision that Idaho's breath
testing complies with LR.E., Rule 702. She noted that the ISP announced its approved breath
methods through SOPs and manuals. Judge Lansing wrote that appellate courts have to treat such
documents as "rules" for the purpose of judicial review because they constitute the only materials
by which the ISP has acted upon the I.C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004(4) authorization for breath
testing standards'. Judge Lansing noted: "But a "standard" that is merely a recommendation, and

1

Administration regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as statutes. See Mason v. Donnelly
Club, 135 Id. 581, 586,21 P3d 903, 908 (2001).
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hence optional, is no standard at all - it is merely something that the officers maintaining and
operating the Intoxilyzer 5000 may do if they wish or may disregard." At p. 388. Judge Lansing
indicated that if the rules weren't mandatory, then there could not be any sort of standard: "This
result, however, is obviously not what is intended by the ISP. The ISP clearly did intend to
promulgate standards, not just make optional, take or leave suggestions for how an Intoxilyzer 5000
could be maintained and operated." At p. 389.
Judge Lansing was wrong in her assessment ofISP intentions. Judge Lansing also notes, in
footnote no. 7, the problem with the use of the term "approximately":
"There is no need here to go into an analysis of the propriety of using the term
"approximately" in a rule that is supposed to be setting defined standards, but
the problems caused by its use are as obvious as the problems caused by the use
of "should".
At p. 390.
There is no scientific reason behind the use of "should" in the SOP other than as Judge
Lansing feared - so that officers or operators could do as they wish with breath machines. Additional
e-mails have also been produced in Mr. Besaw's DUr case on appeal, State v. Besaw, Supreme Court
Case #39874. The people in charge of the breath testing program in Idaho simply want to use
"vagueness" and "wiggle room" instead of scientific standards. Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion
becomes that much more important now that the Court has access to the e-mails and the real thought
behind the so called "standards" developed by ISPFS. The Wheeler Court reviewed the mandatory
provision of the SOP at the time of the Wheeler ALS. Those mandatory provisions, like for the 15
minute wait, are now discretionary. See SOP Section 6.1 ("should" instead of "must" regarding the

15 minute wait). R. at p. 468 2 .

2

See Wheeler i{)otnotes 2, 3, 4 which note the lise ofwo,d "should" and "must" through out the prior SOP. Wheeler at p. 386.
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In State v. Bell, 115 Id. 36, 764 P.2d ] 13 eCL App. 1988), the Court interprets

I.e.

§18-

8004( 4). The statute allows aleohol results, either blood, breath or urine, to be introduced into
evidence without an expert testifying regarding the same. The Court of Appeals stated:

"The admissibility of the result of a scientific test such as the blood-alcohol
test in I.e. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which establishes the
acceptability, validity, reliability and accuncy of the test and test
procedures. In the admission of a test result for alcohol concentration the
Legislature has concluded that certain foundational elements need not be
presented at trial unless such elements are disputed. The Legislature has
acknowledged that certain tests, due to a history of reliability and accuracy, are
presumed to be valid and acceptable ... The Legislature has enacted a statutory
scheme which allows an expedient method for admitting a blood-aleohol test
result into evidence without the need for some expert testimony ... Inherent in
this statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature of the need
for uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result can only be the
product of a test procedure which from previous use is known to be capable of
producing an accurate result. This benefit is best provided by strict adherence to
a uniform procedure. This was recognized by the Legislature and is apparent
first, from the statutory language which provides for the test procedure to be
determined by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and second, by the
'shall' language mandating adherence to the standards set by that Department."
(emphasis added)
At p. 39.
ISP Forensic Services (ISPFS) is more interested in getting past legal challenges then setting
up scientific standards that will follow the requirements of Bell and 1. C. § 18-8004(4). The Court can
go through the e-mails and note that many people that are making suggestions are not scientists.
In it's decision, the District Court in Mr. Besaw's case fails to apply the reasoning set out in
Wheeler, supra, and Bell, supra. Judge Lansing was dead on when she said there had to be
mandatory standards for 1. C. § 18-8004(4) to have any sort of meaning. The legislature used the
word "shall" in it's statutory pronouncement regarding aleohol testing.

The District Court

specifically missed the point when it said: "Second, the Petitioner fails to provide evidence that the
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breath test in question was not administered in conformity with the applicabJe test procecure." R.
atp.910.
The whole point of this issue is that there are no scientific standards in the State of Idaho
regarding breath testing. The applicable test procedures must be based upon scientific standards not
vagueness and wiggle room. The "applicable test procedure" must meet the requirements of Bell,

supra. I.e. § 18-8002A(7)(d) states:
"The test for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of § 18-8004(4) Idaho Code ... "
State v. Bell, supra, specifically notes that the results of "scientific tests such as breath
alcohol testing" normally turn on a foundation which establishes the acceptability, validity, reliability
and accuracy of the test and test procedure. The Court has the ability to call into question the
acceptability, validity, reliability and accuracy of the SOP used at the time ofMr. Besaw's testing.
The fact that Bell, supra, is a criminal case makes no difference because the opinion discusses I.C.
§ 18-8004(4) which is at the heart of breath testing for an ALS.

The District Court should have vacated the license suspension pursuantto I.C. § 67-5279(3).
The actions ofISPFS violated statutory or constitutional provisions and were made upon an unlawful
procedures or were arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion. An examination of the individual
e-mails proves the point. The Court can start with the e-mail in which Matthew Garnette notes that
there are a couple of changes he would like to make to the IDAPA rules. R. at p. 135. He states:
"They are fairly minor, but are causing all kinds of issues in court"( emphasis added). Why is ISPFS
worrying about court issues? Scientists should be worried about scientific standards and not what
makes life easier for prosecutors, ALS hearing officers and police officers in court.
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There is an e-mail from Eric Moody to Mr. Garnette, noting that he is one of the Idaho
Transportation Department (lTD) hearing officers. R. at p. 139. He notes that two attorneys during
oral argument noted problems with the SOP that was in effect for that particular set ofDUls 3 . Why
a hearing officer for ITD is complaining to ISPFS about the "standards" that are in place is unknown.
ALS hearing officers have no business making these sorts of comments or participating in the
development of scientific standards for Idaho breath testing. Standards should be developed based
on science, not on what helps prosecute drivers who have been stopped for DUls.
There is an e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees of the ISPFS.

Mr. Jewkes

states: "I am not sure ifI dare ask, but are there any other parts ofthe SOP that you feel needs

immediate attention, such as changing 'will' to 'may' or 'approximately' or doing away with
'monthly' etc. (Jeremy here is your chance: )". (emphasis added) It is interesting to note that in
this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the ":)" emoticon. Is this the way scientists should be
acting, is this the way scientific standards are developed? R. p. 146.
Jeremy Johnson uses the words: " ... I am just suggesting putting in some wiggle room
language ... ", (emphasis added). R. p. 148. Where is the science in using "wiggle room" language?
The ISP concern seems to be that ALS cases are being tossed. Whether cases get tossed really is not
relevant to a discussion as to the scientific standards for breath testing.
There are also discussions regarding the use of the 0.2 solution and the need for linearity. The
only one who seems to be concerned about scientific standards is David Laycock. He notes: "IJust

3

SOP 6.2 dated 8/20110 states "A complete breath alcohol test includes (2) valid breath samples taken during the testing
sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath samples should be approximately 2 minutes apan to allow for the dissipation of
potential mouth alcohol COnlaminatioJ1." (emphasis original)
sOP 6.2 dated I 1101110 states "A completed alcohol test includes (2) valid breath samples taken during the testing sequencC' and preceded
by air blanks. The duplicate breath samples should be approximately 2 n~inutes apart, or more, for the ASJIj's and the FC20's to allow for
the dissipation ofpotcntial mouth alcohol contamination' (emphasis original)
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don't think this is the time to cut back on quality standards". R. p. 149. He goes into a discussion
about compliance with SOP. Jeremy Johnson notes: "It is good scientific practice to check linearity
because that lends credence to accuracy of the numbers that the instrument generates." R. p. 151.
Linearity is discussed below regarding the use of the 0.20 solution.
The e-mails note the ability to put language in the SOP that protects the operators by
allowing someone to come in and testify around any problems. R. p. I 52.
There is also a discussion by Jeremy Johnston noting that a mandatory word like "must"
would be replaced with a discretionary word like "should". R. at p.152. Again, where is the
science? What would the majority in Wheeler have decided if they had these e-mails to review?
Jeremy Johnston uses the term "wiggle room" regarding the 0.20 language. R. p.153 "Wiggle room"
language is used regarding the simulator. R. p. 154.
Why involve prosecutors, attorney generals, and the appellate division of the attorney
generals' office in the development of scientific standards. ISPFS has not developed breath testing
scientific standards, it's simply developed "wiggle words" to get around problems with ALS and
D UI matters.
The Court should make a determination that the "applicable test procedure" in place on
January 16,2011 did not meet the requirements ofLC. § lS-S004( 4) and the holding in State v. Bell,

supra. The District Court's analysis of the issue regrading SOP standards is too simplistic and
misses the point of developing scientific standards for breath testing in the State of Idaho. Simply
having ISP Forensic Services develop a SOP that has discretionary language to prevent defense
challenges is inappropriate and does a disservice to the citizens of the State ofIdaho.
I.C. § IS-S002A(5)(b )(vi) states: "That the person was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs
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or other intoxicating substances as provided in this chapter, and that the results of the test indicated
an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the
provisions of Section 18-8004, lS-S004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code." (emphasis added) See also
Subsection 7(c) and 7(d).
I.C. § 18-8004C is the provision of Idaho Code that notes excessive DUIs, over an alcohol
concentration of 0.20. ISPFS has set "standards" for excessive cases. R. at p. 298. The reason the
legislature has allowed the expedited introduction of breath test, blood test and urine test results in
DUIs and ALS matters is because of the guarantee of science. See Sta1e-Y...:13eIL 115 Id. 36, 764 P.2d
113 eCt. App. 1988), State v. Phillips, 117 Id. 609, 790 P.2d 390 eCt. App. 1990), and State v.
Nickerson, 132 Id. 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Cl. App. 1999). Note what the Wheeler court stated4 . The
Court also has a duty to judge these "standards" pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 regarding
the scientific reliability of evidence.
In addition, the taking ofMr. Besaw's driver's license is made upon an unlawful procedure
and is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. See I.e. § 67 -5279 5 • In State v. Breed, III

4 "However, the SOPs also contain many provio:ions directing that a procedure "should" be followed. TO READ "SHOULD" as
meaning "must" would eliminate any purpose to the semantic distinction drawn by the Idaho State Police (lSP) when the regulations were
promulgated. We are not persuaded that the ISP meant for such a distinction to be meaningless and illusory"
At pp. 385-386.

5 67-5279. Scope of review -- Type of relief. (I) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions offacl. (2) When the agency was not required by the provisions of this chapter or by other provisions of
law to base its action exclusively on a record, the court shall amrl11 tl](' agency action unless the court finds that the action was~
(a) in violatioll of constitutional or statutory provision3;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedilre: or
(d) arbitrary, capncious, or an abuse of discretion
Ifthe agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further pro~eedings as necessary.
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions Dfthis chapter or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall amrm the
agency action unless the cour! finds that the agency's findings, inferences. coneiusions, or deciSIons are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess ofthe statutory authority orthe agency:
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a Whole: or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set 3oide. in whole or in paI1, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
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Id. 497, 725 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1986), the Court of Appeals stated:
"The purpose of Section 18-8002, as we read it, is to provide an incentive for
motorists to cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol content by a
reasonable precise scientific method" (emphasis added)
At. p. 501.
In Mr. Breed's case, there was an analysis of equal protection and the court concluded that
the rational basis tests had been satisfied. However, if it was clear that the breath testing system was
not "a reasonable precise scientific method" then the Breed court would not have found compliance
with equal protection.
The court can go back and review State v. Bell, 115 ld. 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988)
when the court stated:
"Inherent in the statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the legislature
of the need for uniform test procedures. An 'extremely reliable" test result
can only be the product of a test procedure which from previous use is known
to be capable of producing an accurate result. This benefit is best provided
by strict adherence to an uniform procedure. This was recognized by the
Legislature and is apparent first, from the statutory language which provides
for the test procedure to be determined by the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare, and second, by the' shall' language mandating adherence to the
standards set by that Department." (emphasis original)
At. p. 39.
The Court can review State v. Mills, 128 Id. 426, 913 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App. 1996) when the
court in interpreting statutes, rules and regulations noted as follows:
"Under the rule oflenity, cnminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor
of the accused. (cites omitted) The same principle of construction that
applies to statutes applies to rules and regulations propagated by
administrati ve agencies." (cites omitted)

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial nghts of the
appellant have been prejudiced
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At p. 429.
As Judge Lansing indicated in Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Id. 378,223
P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2009), there can not be "discretionary standards".

Standards have to be

mandatory to meet the requirements of the due process for taking of someone' s driving privileges.
The legislature assumed that the State would develop scientific standards for breath testing. The
intent of providing the above noted e-mails is to show the true intent of the SOP changes and the lack
ofI.C. § 18-8004(4) standards.

B.
THE TROOPER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ST ANDARD OPERt\ TION PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT
OF A .20 SOLUTION PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION
Mr. Besaw was arrested by Trooper Talbott on January 16,2011. Mr. Besaw blew a 0.219,
insufficient and a 0.201 breath test. R. at p. 73. The 24 hour performance verification check was
run with a 0.8 solution, lot number 10802, bottle 0353 at 4:27 on January 16,2011. R. at p. 73. J.C.
§ 18-8004(4) requires that breath testing be run pursuant to scientific standards developed by the ISP.
The Court can also note the IDAPA rules that require standards be put into place.

IDAPA

11.03.01.014.03.
The District Court in it's decision does not analyze why there are requirements for both a
0.08 performance verification solution and a 0.20 performance verification solution. The proceeding
section noted the e-mails from ISPFS. Those e-mails discussed the need for a 0.20 solution. and that
need deals with linearity. The very reason that ISP Forensic Services put into place a 0.20 solution
was to verify breath tests above 0.20. In the State ofIdaho, an excessive breath test starts at 0.20.
For a non-excessive breath test, a performance verification using a 0.08 solution makes sense
because oflinearity. A 0.20 verification supports an excessive breath test because oflinearity.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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There was not a 0.20 solution verification check within 24 hours of Mr. Besaw's test. R. at
pp.72-73. The SOP that was in place at the time has a requirement that there be a 0.20 performance
verification within 24 hours. R. at p. 464. 5.1.4 of the SOP specifically notes that the 0.20
performance verification was implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the instruments
results for an lS-S004C charge, in other words, a blow over .20. Failure to timely perform a 0.20
performance verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or in
charges other then 18-S004C. R. at p. 464. SOP rule 5.1.4.1 states:
"The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for performance
verification within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level."
(emphasis added)
R. at p. 464.

There is no such rule for a 0.80 solution for an excessive breath test. It is clear that for a
0.20 blow, there has to be a 0.20 performance verification within 24 hours of the test. If not,
there is not a valid breath test. The court should apply the rule of lenity found in State v. Mills,
128 rd. 416, 913 P .2d. 1196 (Ct. App. 1996) regarding the interpretation of these sections of the
SOP.

The whole reason for using different solution values is to determine the accuracy of the

instrument at a 0.80 breath test and a 0.20 breath test, which are all statutory limits developed by the
legislature. The rule of lenity must be applied to protect Mr. Besaw and his due process rights.
The ALS hearing officer and the District Court did not apply science to the use of the 0.20
solution verification within 24 hours of Mr. Besaw's breath test. They simply contorted the English
language to the benefit of the State's case as opposed to what benefits science regardiag breath
testing and linearity. If nothing else, the District Court failed to apply the rule of lenity which was
noted it State v. Mills, supra. Either way, the breath testing was not conducted pursuant to the
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scientific requirements of linearity.
The e-mails between Mr. Johnston, Darren Jewkes and David Laycock support the linearity
rational. R. at pp. 82-86. Again, the COUli has to go back to the reason for the expedited evidentiary
procedure for allowing breath tests in an ALS hearing or DUI case from the State v. Bell, 115 Id. 36,
764 P.2d 113 eCt. App. 1988) and State v. Breed, 111 Id. 497, 725 P.2d 202 eCt. App. 1986).
The term "performance verification" is found in the glossary of the SOP which states:

"Performance Verification: A verification of the accuracy of the breath
testing instrument using a simulator in a performance verification solution.
Performance verification should be repOlied to three decimal places. While
ISPFS uses the term performance verification, manufactures and others may
use a term such as . cali bration check' or 'simulator check. '"
There is also a definition for Performance Verification Solution:

"A premixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verificatiom~ .
The solution is provided by and/or approved by ISPFS."
R. at p. 299.

Linearity requires a 0.20 solution performance verification with 24 hours of the breath test.
The ISP reference manual for the Lifeloc FC20 states as follows: "Performance verifications are
checks ofthe instruments performance using verified standard solutions." R. at p. 221.
The District Court has incorrectly interpreted the language from section 5.1.1.1 4: ''The 0.20
performance verification satisfies the requiremenl for performance verification within 24 hours,
before or after an evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification solution should
not be used routinely for this purpose." R. at p. 307. It is clear that the performance verification is
not recommended for anything other than 0.20 breath samples or above. There is nothing in the SOP
that indicates that the 0.08 solution satisfies the requirement for any evidentiary tests at "anv level".
If there were a provision in the SOP that said the 0.08 performance verification could be run for
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evidentiary testing at "any level" then there would probably be a different argument, but that
language is not found in the SOP.
Co
A 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD WAS NOT PROPERLY CONDUCTED

There has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State v. Stump,
146 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case points to the specific standard of observation
required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, supra.
In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test his breath
alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room with Mr. Stump. The
Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any circumstances or conditions inside the
room which might have interfered with or impaired the arresting officer's senses. Officer Hurt also
advised Mr. Stump to tell him if he had belched or regurgitated during the 15 minute wait. In Mr.
Besaw's case, the arresting officer did not tell Mr. Besaw that he needed to advise the ofIicer if he
actually bclched, burped, or the like. In Wilkinson v. ITD, 151 Idaho 784,264 P.3d. 680 (Ct. App.
2011), the Court in f()otnote 4 discussed the issue of being instructed not to belch:
"Although the ot1icer did not do so in this case, it would enhance law
enforcement procedures to simply ask the suspect if she belched, burped,
vomited, or did anything else during the waiting period that might skew the
test results. Previous cases have taken note of whether or not the officer
addressed such type of question to a subject. See e.g. Stump, 146 Idaho at
861,203 P.3d at 1260; Carson, 133 Idaho at 452,988 P.2d at 226."
At p. 684.
In the Wilkinson case, the question of observation was before the Court. The Court of
Appeals ruled against the driver, however, the Wilkinson test took place in a concrete room designed
for breath testing. There were three video cameras capturing the events as they occurred. The
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hearing officer viewed these recordings before making his decision. In addition, there was another
female officer in the room standing directly behind Wilkinson during the period of time Officer
Davis had his back turned to Wilkinson. Wilkinson under scores the problems that are found in Mr.
Besaw's case regarding the observation period. Trooper Talbott did not ask Mr. Besaw ifhe burped,
belched, or the like, before breath testing began. The trooper did not videotape the events as was
found in the Wilkinson case, he could have but specifically choose not to.
In State v. Carson. 133 Idaho 451, (Ct. App. 1999), the Court was faced with a 15 minute
wait that occurred in a law enforcement vehicle while the driver was being transported to the
Washington County Sheriffs Office to use the Intoxilyzer 5000. In that case, Mr. Carson was asked
if he had belched or vomited or burped, etc. during the drive. The arresting officer said he
intermittently observed Mr. Carson in the rearview mirror and listened for any indication of belching
or regurgitation. The arresting officer testified that because of the late hour he encountered no traffic
on the road and his police radio was quiet throughout the trip. The officer then acknowledged during
cross examinatIOn that is was raining and that the windshield wipers were operating. The Court
found that the arresting officer's attention was not devoted to Mr. Carlson and that evidence
presented at the motion hearing and common sense, tells us that an officer's ability to use his hearing
as a substitute for visual observation was impeded by noise with the automobile engine, tires on the
road, rain and windshield wipers.
In State v. DeFranco. supra, a similar situation to Mr. Besaw's case is presented. The
instrument used was the AlcoSensor Ill. In DeFrancQ. the officer left the patrol car's rear door open
and entered through the front passenger door, called dispatch momentarily and removed his
AlcoSensor equipment that had been on the front seat. He then walked to the rear of the vehicle,
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opened the trunk and looked through a file box to find a advisory form. The Court found that the
observation period was not possible based on these circumstances.
The Court noted that, as in Carson, the officer was not always in a physical position to either
use his sight or alternatively his senses of smell or hearing to accomplish the purpose of the
monitoring period:
"If an officer deviates from that practice, without beginning the fifteen minute
period anew, which is always an alternative in cases of uncertainty, the
officer risks that the breath test results will be rendered inadmissible. Such
is the result here."
DeFranco, supra, at p. 338.
The arresting law enforcement officer's senses were distracted by outside influences. During
the 15 minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was distracted by Lewiston police officers. Video
Time 02:46:40 - 02:47:29. There is a specific reference to him telling them to leave him alone for
the next four (4) minutes. Instead of them Jeaving him alone, they continued to talk to him and he
continued to talk to them. He directed them to get the advisory forms which were in his vehicle.
This is not a situation in which all of this is happening in an enclosed room like the Intoxilyzer 5000
EN at the Nez Perce County Jail. Mr. Besaw was sitting m the vehicle, the door was open, Trooper
Talbott was standing outside talking to at least one Lewiston police officer regarding the advisory
form.
During the observation period and breath sequence one of the passengers got out of the
vehicle and approached Trooper Talbott. Video Time 02:53: 13 - 02:53 :41. At that time, Trooper
Talbott's attention was directed to the passenger, due in part to officer safety since he was there by
himself. His attention was directed away from Mr. Besaw and towards the passenger. His sight and
hearing were directed towards someone other then Mr. Besaw. None of the case law cited herein

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

23
LAW OFFICES OF

CLARK

AND

FEENEY

LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

requires that the Driver prove that he burped, etc, the Driver only has to prove that the 15 mmute
observation was not followed. The case law is very clear.
In the middle ofthe breath testing sequence, the Trooper's attention was again directed away
from Mr. Besaw and to the wife of one of the other passengers who had arrived, exited her vehicle,
and approached the police vehicle. Video Time 02:55:32 - 02:55:58.
In State v. Carson, supra, the observation period was in the vehicle and the Court found that
the observation period was not valid. In Carson, there were no other distracting police officers, there
were no distractions of passengers or passenger's wives. Carson and the officer were in an enclosed
car with window wipers, engine noise and tires on the road. ]n Mr. Besaw's case, there is the radio
traffic from dispatch during the 15 minute observation. There is the noise of the window wipers.
There is the noise of passing traffic.
There is no evidence in Besaw that some other senses replaced the senses of sight or hearing.
There is no indication that a person standing outside a vehicle, with someone sitting inside a vehicle,
could smell anything such as a burp or the like. Again, noted the rainy, wet weather and the
likelihood of using the scnse of smell. Obviously, the senses of touch and taste do not apply. The
three senses that were available in this case were distracted or not realistically available during the
observation period.
Trooper Talbott's actions with the Lifeloc and another in the car breath test are also at issue
in the appeal from the District Court in Bever v. ITD, Supreme Court Case Number 39886-2012.
The Intoxilyzer 5000 EN, approximately 5 or 10 minutes away from the location of the stop, was not
used. The Trooper used the portable Lifeloc instead of the Intoxilyzcr 5000 EN which is in an
enclosed room at the jail, with no distractions and the like.
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The hearing officer and the District Court simply discount all ofthe things noted above. The
District Court cited to State v. Carson, supra, and State v. DeFranco, supra, but at no time compared
the facts of Carson and DeFranco to the facts of Mr. Besaw's case. One would assume that in
analyzing these cases, a comparison of the facts would have to be done to determine whether the
holding in each case would be applicable to Mr. Besaw's case.
Mr. Besaw does not have to have a Homer Simpson type burp to prove his case. In fact, Mr.
Besaw does not have to prove that he belched, burped or vomited. He just has to show the Court that
the observation period was not properly complied with. Ifhe did burp, what would the smell be?
We already know on this record that Mr. Besaw had an odor of an alcohol beverage.
The Court also has to question why the trooper did not turn on his video to record the
advisory and the breath testing. Mr. Besaw could have been recorded the whole time, but Trooper
Talbott does not do that. There is no explanation for it. Mr. Besaw has a Class A driver's license
which is an important property right to him because it involves his livelihood. The technology was
available, but the trooper simply ignored using it. His credibility is at issue. See In the Interests of
Doe, 130 Id. 811, 815, 948 P .2d 166, 170 eel. App. 1997), State v. Dominguez, 13 7Id. 681, 52 P .3d
325 (et. App. 2002).
The State may argue that Mr. Besaw simply wants the court to replace it's judgment for the
judgment of the hearing officer. One would have to assume that is what the State argued in the other
cases dealing with the observation period such as: State v. Stump, 14 Id. 857 (CL App. 2009), State
v. Carson, 133 Id. 451 (Ct. App. 1999), and State v. DeFranco, 143 Id. 335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App.
2006).
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The State argued to the District Court below the following:
"The sufficiency of the waiting period isn't as essential as it may have been
when the Idaho Appellate Court was deciding State v. Carson, 133 Idaho
451, 988P.2d225(Ct.App.1999)orStatev. DeFranco, 1431daho335, 144
P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006). It is comparing apples and oranges to suggest that
the same analysis of the operating and training manuals then existing and the
Standard Operating Procedures as they exist now, produces the same results
as the early breath testing cases."
R. at p. 761.

The State makes this argument but does not explain exactly how this is true. Has the
equipment changed? Has the manufacturers recommendations changed? Has the science changed?
I-Ias Henry's law, the scientific foundation for breath testing, changed? The only thing that has
changed is ISP Forensic Services' decision to make ·'standards" discretionary. The e-mails that are
part ofthis record show why there is a change. However, there is no change regarding the mandatory
15 minute observation period as the SOP requires. ·'Proper testing procedure by certified operators
is necessary in order to provide accurate results." R. at p. 311.
The Court has to wonder whethcr "should" really is discretionmy when the SOP states as
follows: "Any material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the month
prior to the start of the 15 minute waiting period." (emphasis added) R. at p. 311. IfMr. Besaw had
an apple in his mouth or a chew soaked with alcohol or a lemon or 12 marbles, does the officer have
discretion to allow that material to remain in the mouth during the wait period and during the blow.
What about the following from the SOP, "During the monitoring period the subject/individual
should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eal or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate." Rat. p. 311. Again,

ifMr. Besaw was smoking, drinking, eating, burping, vomiting and regurgitating, could the breath
samples be valid because the word "should" is used in the SOP? Prior examples of the procedure
of the 15 minute wait are as follows:
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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"Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be monitored for
fifteen (15) minutes. During this time the subject may not smoke, drink, or
chew gum, candy, food, or any tobacco product. A material which
absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to
the start of the fifteen minute waiting period."
SOP 11/2006 Paragraph 3.1. See Wheeler at p. 768.
It is clear that this language including the "may not" and the "should" are all mandatory

requirements. If they are not, then someone could smoke and drink during the 15 minute wait, and
it would not have an effect on the breath test.
The two valid breath samples in Besaw were quite a distance apart, .219/.201. The fact that
the samples had such a wide variance supports mouth alcohol in Mr. Besaw's first breath sample.
Compare these samples to the other breath tests from other drivers noted on the log sheet. R. at p.
73.
The District Court also ignores the fact that Mr. Besaw was eating a hamburger while he was
driving. The Court can note the food that came f1ying out ofMr. Besaw's mouth during the time he
was in the parking lot. How many fact patterns has the court seen in which someone was eating a
hamburger just minutes before the breath test, and that food was in the person's mouth just prior to
the observation period starting? In the cases cited above, there is no testimony from the drivers
about burping, vomiting, regurgitating or the like and still the courts found a violation of the 15
minute observation period.
The hearing officer's conclusion is not supported by the record. The appellate courts have
routinely reversed hearing officer decisions regarding the observation periods associated with
vehicles. Mr. Besaw met his burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d).
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D.
THE ARRESTING OFFICER MISINFORM MR. BESAW
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS SUSPENSION
The Court has to determine the credibility and competence of the arresting officer, who was
also the operator of the breath machine. In this particular instance, the arresting office failed to
properly advise Mr. Besaw of the requirement set out in

I.e.

§ I8-B002A.

Trooper Talbott

specifically indicated that he did not read the bold capitalized letters at the bottom of the advisory
section of the advisory form. He specifically failed to read the following: "THIS SUSPENSION

FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE EVIDENTIARY TEST(S) IS SEPARATE FROM
ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT."
In Cunningham v. State, 150 Id. 687, 249 P.3d 880 (et. App. 2011), the Court found that
there was improper advisement of rights. As a result of the improper advisement, the refusal was
dismissed. R. at p. 104. The Court of Appeals cited to several cases to support its position,
~Btate,

~ling

150 Id 188, 245 P.3d 499, (Ct. App.) (2010), In Re Griffiths, 113 Id 364, 744 P.2d 92,

(1987), In Re Beem, 119 Id 289,805 P.2d 495, (Ct. App. 1991), In Re VirgiL 126 Id 946,849 P.2d
182, (e1. App. 995).
Mr. Besaw asked about the consequences ofhis CDL Class A license. Video Time 02:40: 13.
The trooper indicated to Mr. Besaw that there was not any real difference from what the advisory
noted. Video Time 02:40:16. Mr. Besaw had a Class A License at the time of the arrest.
The trooper was asked whether he was required to know the laws of the State ofIdaho. He
responded, "General principles, yes." ALS T. at p. 24, 1. 9. At the hearing, the trooper is then asked
if a CDL was going to be suspended for one year with no driving privileges and he answered "he
believes so:' ALS T. at p. 24, 11. 10-12. He was then asked whether or not the advisory gave that
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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information. He indicated that he did not have the advisory right in front him so he could not quote
anything from it even though he had done numerous DUls and reading from ALS forms since 2006.
He did finally acknowledge that he did not recollect any advisory noting the year's suspension as
being absolute for a CDL license. ALS T at p. 24, lines 20-24. Counsel then tried to play the video
so that the arresting officer could hear what was on the video. Of course, that did not work. ALS
T. at pp. 25-26.
Clearly, the ISP trooper gave Mr. Besaw incorrect information. The fact that he indicated
that he did not know what the law was at the time ofthe ALS hearing is that much more compelling
in this circumstance regarding notice. The case law is very clear regarding the legislative scheme
on proper notice. Mr. Besaw had a Class A license. The arresting officer, who like any ordinary
citizen, is required to know the law, in fact one would have to assume that an ]SP officer would have
a much better understanding of what the law is than a ordinary citizen. See Buell v. ITD, 151 Id.
257,254 P.3d 1253 (et. App. 2011).
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that trial court must consider the absence of a recording
when the interrogating officer conveniently could have made one in the evaluation of the officer's
credibility. In Interest of Doe, 130 Id 811, 948 P.2d 166, (1977). In State v. Dominguez., 137 Id.
681,52 P.3d 325 (Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals commented favorable on the Doe decision.
The Court in Dominguez noted that the credibility of witnesses is vested in the trial court because
the trial court has the opportunity to view the witnesses while they testify and could evaluate their
demeanor. The ALS hearing officer had no such ability to judge Trooper Talbott.
The Court knows that Trooper Talbott conveniently could not remember things and had not
reviewed the video tape prior to his hearing. Therefore, the COUli of Appeals and Supreme Court's
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comments regarding the ability to assess the accuracy and truthfulness of officers' account can be
influenced by the failure of said officer to record what would be considered the crucial portion of
the encounter with Mr. Besaw. The Court can also look State v.

Guzma~,

122 Id 981,984 N.l, 842

P.2d 660, 663 N. 1 (1992), where the Supreme Court noted that a pattern of failures to record may
be looked on with jaundiced eye and the Court could rule accordingly. There is no reason that the
Trooper Talbott did not click on the inside recorder like he did in Beyer case also on appeal. He had
every oppOliunity to actually show the breath test and the actions of Mr. Besaw. He choose not to
do that. His lack of memory and his failure to know Idaho law should be considered by the Court
in determining his credibility.
The Court in Buell v. ITD, 151 Id. 257, 257 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 20] I), cited to Wilson v.
State. 133 ld.

~P4,

993 P.2d 1205, (Ct. App. 2000), when it found that a holder of a CDL is

presumed to have knowledge of laws governing CDLs. It is clear that Mr. Besaw was confused by
what the officer had just read to him considering he had a Class A commercial driver's license. Mr.
Besaw wanted to clarify that issue. One would assume that an ISP trooper would have a superior
knowledge regarding the laws governing CDLs since he is a state trooper and is required to enforce
the laws of the State of Idaho. Yet, the trooper misinformed Mr. Besaw. This misinformation is
compounded by the language used in I.e. § l8-8002A.

I.e. §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A are part of

the criminal code.
The Appeal Court in Buell and Peck failed to analyze the issue the Supreme Court found so
vital in Wanner v. lTD, 150 Id. 164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011). The notice states that th~ license
suspension is for ,90 days. I. C. § 18-8002A makes no distinction between a Class A license or a
Class D license. Mr. Besaw was read a notice that specifically told him that his license, a Class A
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license, would be suspended for 90 days, not for a year. The Supreme Court in Wanner, states as
follows:
"The notice did not address the situation presented by the underlying facts of
this case: the consequence of refusing or failing evidentiary testing for a
holder of a CDL who was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of
the contact with law enforcement. This is significant because I.C. § 49335(2) provides that a motorist who fails evidentiary testing is disqualified
from operating a commercial vehicle for not less than one year."
At p. 166.
The District Court in Wanner in it's second decision stated:
"Due process requires the drivers with CDLs, who are driving noncommercial vehicles at the time of suspension, be given notice ofthe impact
of I.C. § 49-335(2) and it's one year disqualification in the Notice of
Suspension. Without that notice CDL drivers can not make an informed
decision regarding whether to file to an appeal under I.e. § IS-S002 and I.C.
§ IS-8002A within the required seven days."
Atp.167.
One: would have to assume that District Court Judge was a person of common intelligence.
)Villiams v. ITD, 2012 WL 306S793. The j:Villiarn~ case does not have a situation in which the state
trooper is giving misinformation. The Supreme Court in Wanner then goes on to state the following:
"Our interpretation of these two separate issues is based upon the language
of the relevant statutes. I.C. § IS-8002A refers to the suspension of 'the
person's driver's license' and specifies the possibility of a temporary permit
after thirty 30 days. I.e. § 18-S002A(5)(a). By contrast, I.C. § 49-335
provides that the holder of a CDL 'is disqualified from operating a
commercial motor vehicle ... ' I.e. § 49-335(2). Thus, the IS-S002A
suspension governed Warner's driving privileges in toto, while the 49-335
suspension only applies to a particular subset of driving privileges, l.e.,
War'ner's right to operate a commercial vehicle."
At pp. 169-170.
I.C. § 49-335 sets out the disqualifications and penalties for a commercial driver's license
under certain circumstances.
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commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one year if the person refuses to or submits
to and fails the test to determine the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances while
operating a motor vehicle. In Mr. Besaw's case, he was not driving a commercial vehicle. He was
actually driving someone else's pickup truck at the time he was stopped. I.C. § 49-335(7) states:
"The person who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a commercial
motor vehicle within this state while having any detectable amount of alcohol
in his system or who refuses to submit to an alcohol test rnust be placed out
of service for 24 hours and be subject to the provisions of Section 18-8002,
Idaho Code."
The advisory form, on the back page, gives notice as to penalties for driving a commercial
vehicle and failing evidentiary tests.

See paragraphs 2A and 2B.

R. at p. 71. IDAPA Rule

39.02.72.900 states as follows:
"Commercial Drivers. If a person is stopped while driving or in actual
physical control of a commercial motor vehicle (as defined by Section 49123(2)( c» and is given an evidentiary test indicating an alcohol concentration
of four hundredths (.04) through seven hundredths (.07) in violation of
Section 18-8004(b) Idaho Code, the notice of suspension served shall state,
in addition to the information required by Section 18-8002A Idaho Code, that
01. Class A, Band C licenses. Only Class A, Band C driving privileges
shall be suspended, unless the driver is twenty one (21) years then all driving
privileges shall be suspended; and

02. Restrictive Privileges. A restricted driving permit shall not be issued by
the department for the operation of commercial vehicles during the term of
this suspension."
A copy of said Rule is attached for the Court's ease ofreferences as Exhibit "A6 ".
So it seems that there are requirements for notice to drivers of commercial vehicles regarding
the sanctions for driving with alcohol in their systems. Why is there no notice requirement for Class
A licensed drivers when they are not driving commercial vehicles? The sanctions are both very
6

rhis provision was deleted by ITO on May I 2011
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severe. The failure to provide notice ofthe I.e. § 49-335 sanctions to those driving non-commercial
vehicles is detrimental and a due process violation.
In In Re Virgil, 126 Id. 946, 895 P.2d 182 eCt. App. 1995), the Court was faced with an
advisory that specifically delineated between the different types of driver licenses, A, B, C, and D.
The Virgil court noted that the appellate courts have emphatically discounted interjection ofjudicial
gloss upon the legislature's license suspension scheme. The Virgil court also noted the problem with
the advisory that was in use at the time that it could be read in two different ways, one that benefits
the driver and one that did not. Virgil at p. 947.
Trooper Talbott did not know what the law was. It would be simple enough for the State to
have put in the advisory a notice regarding the Class A penalty. Other states do this. Attached and
marked Exhibit "B" are notices from other states. The District Court in it's opinion stated, "The
Petitioner contents he was misinformed because he was not told that failing the evidentiary test could
also affect his CDL driving privileges." R. at p. 761.
The District Court totally misses the point regarding I.e. § 18-8002A and the notice
requirement. Mr. Besaw only had a Class A COL driver's license. He did not have a Class 0
driver's license. When the District Court says that failing evidentiary tests could also affect his COL
driving privileges misses the point that the only driving privileges he had were his COL driving
privileges. There is no "also" about it. The District Court does not explain why it uses the word
"also" when Mr. Besaw only had one kind of driver's license.
The District Court fails to say anything about the trooper misinforming Mr. Besaw about the
affect the evidentiary testing would have on his actual COL driver's privileges. Does the trooper
have the right to give misinformation regarding the effect ofI.C. § 49-335. The Buell Court's stated
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that Mr. Buell was presumed to know the disqualification of a eDL was in addition to any
suspension he received under either I.C. §§ 18-8002 or 18-8002A. The Court of Appeals docs not
support this statement by any case law or any analysis of the statutes. This opinion makes no
statutory analysis regarding which statutes were put into place first and what knowledge the
legislature would have had when it placed

I.e.

§ 18-8002A in the Idaho Code.

It would have been easy enough for the legislature to delineated the Class D license penalty
in I.C. § 18-8002A. The legislature did not do so. Mr. Buell and Mr. Besaw are not attorneys.
There are judges on the Supreme COUl1 and at least one District Court judge that are not clear as to
the interpretation ofthese particular statutes. Putting a higher burden on 1\1r. Besaw than judges and
state troopers does not seem to comport with the tenants of due process

7
•

The trooper testified at the hearing that his training required him to read the middJe section
of the suspension advisory. ALS T. at p. 28. The question was:
·'Okay. And if you don't read all of that, then you violated your training with
regard to advising them of all the information that is noted in either the
refusal statute or the ALS statute?
Answer: Yes, I have to read the middle section."
ALS T. at p. 28, II 21-25.
Mr. Besaw was not informed of the information that is set out in bold, black, capital letters;

THIS SUSPENSrON FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE EVIDENTIARY TEST(S) IS
SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT. This
language is consistently found in ALS Advisory notices.
7
State \. Tovnc, lSI Id. 779, ]g3, 264 PJd 418 eCI. App. 20] I). footnote 2 states "Statutory interpretation is made problematic when legislative
mtent IS stated clearly !11 one porlJon ofthe statute but imprecise language elsewhere in tJle statute creates room for argument as to its meaning.
See, e.g, State v. Patterson, 14g Idaho 166, 170.219 P3d 813, 817 eel. App. 2009) and State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 918-19, 935 P2d 174,
j 81-82 eCt App. 1996), both interpreting Idaho Code § 37 ·2739B to reqllire a five-year fixed minimum sentence without suspension of the
sentence desp'te nonmandatory language in some portions ufthe statute
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ITD has determined what needs to be given in the suspension advisory based on the statutory
scheme ofLC. §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A. The two advisory sections are different as noted by State
ofIdaho v. Kling, 150 Id 188,245 P.3d 499 (C1. App. 2010). See also Cunningham v. State, 150
ld. 687,249 P.3d 880 (Ct. App. 2011). In the ALS statute, there is no notice requirement regarding
the $250.00 fine. ITD has required that its advisories contain language regarding no attorney and
that the suspension for failure or refusal is separate from any court ordered suspension.

E.
THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS IN ALS HEARINGS
The Court can use Bell v. ITD, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d. 1030 (2011), in its analysis of the
issue of the hearing officer's promise to have the hearing decision completed within a 30 day
temporary license period. In Bell, the Court found the actions of the hearing officer troubling
because there seemed to be a disregard for Bell's substantial interest in receiving a decision before,
or at least, promptly after the deprivation of his license. Bell at p. 671.
In Mr. Besaw's case, the hearing officer denied a Motion for Stay pending the decision but
stated that a decision would be issue prior to the expiration of the thirty day permit. R. at p. 226.
Mr. Besaw asked for a stay from the hearing officer on February 11,2011. R. at p. 198. This order
was entered by the hearing officer on February 11,2011. An addition request for stay was made by
Mr. Besaw's counsel on February 14,2011, because the order denying stay did not comply with what
it had indicated. Another order denying stay was entered on February 16, 2011. This order also
stated: "The hearing examiner shall issue findings of facts and conclusions of law and order prior
to the expiration of the thirty (30) day temporary permit..." R. at p. 201. The hearing officer did not
enter his decision until March 4, 2011, which is several days after the thirty day permit expired.
Without the District Court's intervention granting a stay, Mr. Besaw would be without his valuable
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property right. The Exparte Order For Stay Pending Judicial Review was dated February 15,2011.
R. at p. 233.

Another stay was entered by the Court on March 10,2011. R. at p. 237.

The Bell Court in a footnote stated:
"If delays of this magnitude occurred in a case where the driver ultimately
prevailed, the driver would have suffered a remediable and unacceptable lost
of driving privileges for over three quarters ofthe minimum suspension term
described by Idaho Code § 18-8002A(4)(a) before issuance of a decision
overturning the suspension."
At p. 671.
There are numerous hearing officer decisions in which license suspensions were vacated,
some were sustained, but all the decision were not reached within any sort of timely mmmer. R. at
p. 593-749. Some are days late, some are months late. The driver's counsel in Bell and in In Re
Gibbar. 143 Id 937,155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App.) (2006), tried to warn the Court of the immense
burdens faced by drivers. These burdens range from subpoenas not being issued, no discovery being
supplied and hearing decisions not being issued in a timely manner to protect any due process rights.

It is well established that the suspension of an issued motor vehicle operator's license
involves State action that adjudicates important property interest of the licence. In such cases, the
licenses or driving privileges are not to be taken away without the procedural due process rights
required by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105,97 S.Ct.
1723,52 L.Ed.2d, 152 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,931 S.Ct. 1586,29 L.Ed.2d, 90 (1971)
and Illinois v. Bajchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 . 103 S.Ct. 3513, 77 L.Ed.2d, 12,66 (1983).
The Court is aware the administrative license suspension scheme and CDL scheme deprives
Mr. Besaw of his driver's privileges which is a valuable right recognized by the Idaho Supreme
Court. See State v. Ankney, 109 Id. 1,704 P.2d 333, (1985) and State v. Kouni, 58 Id. 493, 76 P.2d
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917, (1938),
The Court should focus on Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893,47 L.Ed.2d
18 (1976) in determining whether an administrative proceeding satisfies due process. The Court
needs to go through the factors used in Matthews to detennine due process rights in administrative
proceedings. The first factor deals with the private interest that would be effected by the official
action. The second involves the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.
The final factor involves the government's interest induding the function involved in the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedure would entail. See Bell, supra.
The Court may want to look at Whitesides v. Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor
Vehicle~,

20 P.3d 11,20 Alaska (2001). This case deals with a refusal and whether licensed drivers

are entitled to in person hearings before a hearing officer concerning the revocation of their license
and whether a telephone hearing satisfies due process. In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court held
the witness credibility is material and an in-person hearing was required. The Alaska court cited Bell
v. Burson, supra. The Court then cited a California court which noted the practical importance of
a driver's license in today's travel orientated society. The California court went on to comment in
a contemporary society public transportation may not meet the needs of many travelers and that
transportation such as taxi cabs are not economically feasible for a large portion of the popUlation.
With regard to due process, the Court In The Matter of Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 167; 911 P .2d
754 (1996), simply stated: "Procedural due process requires that a party be provided at an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner". See also Cootz v. State,
117 Idaho 38, 785 P2d 163 (1989). In Abram:' v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P.724 (1922), the
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Supreme Court stated: "Due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any process which
legislature may by law provide, but by such process only it safeguards and protects the fundamental,
constitutional rights of a citizen." At p. 546.
Substantial due process requires that state action which deprives a person of life, liberty or
property have some rational basis, that is, the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate
that the judiciary will characterize is as arbitrary. Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693
(1986).
The standard applicable in due process cases is whether the challenged law bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. In State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d. 742 (Cl.
App. 1995), the Court set out the Matthews test for determining whether State action violates due
process. The Matthews v. Eldridge case is cited in many decisions in the State ofldaho. The Court
can noted Lu Ranching Company v. US, 67 P.3d 85 (2003) and Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Counsel,
136 Idaho 63, 28 P.3d 10,06 (2001).
In State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142,267 P.3d. 729

eel. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals

stated:
"It is fundamental to our legal system that the state shall not deprive 'any
person of life, liberty, or propeliy, without due process of law.' U.S.
Constitution, Amendment Fourteenth, Section One. It is a two step process
to determine due process rights: first, deciding whether a government
decision would deprive an individual of a libeliy or property interest within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause; and second,
if a liberty or property interest is implicated, a balancing test must be applied
to determine what process is due. State v. Rogers 144 Id. 738, 740, 170 P.3d
881,883 (2007)."

At p. 734.
The Distriet Court in determining whether there was no process violations in the process used
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for Mr. Besaw's ALS simply states: "The Petitioner has not established that the delay by the hearing
officer was an undue delay that violated his due process rights." Opinion at p. 14. R. at p. 763.
The District Court may have entered this simplistic decision because it had issued a stay prior
to Mr. Besaw losing his temporary driving privileges. The ability of the District Court to protect the
valuable property right has disappeared as a result of Johnson v. ITD, 2012 WL 1949853, which was
entered March 31, 2012, by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that the District
Court would not have the authority to enter a stay or even hear the ALS judicial review if the petition
was filed prior to a decision being reached. Luckily for Mr. Besaw, an amended petition and a
second stay was entered, so the State can not make the subject matter jurisdiction argument. The
Court of Appeals in the Johnson case noted, "Although this result appears harsh, jurisdiction for
judicial review in this case is limited by the time periods specified in I.e. § 67-5273(2) and
applicable rules, and this court has no authority to disregard those limits." At p. _ .
The :!?esaw hearing officer entered two separate orders which promised to issue a decision
within the 30 day temporary license period. He did not keep his promises. Now there is no remedy
to protect a driver from the frivolous nature of the hearing officer's lack of timeliness, therefore due
process is violated. There was an "undue delay" that violated Mr. Besaw's due process right. The
Court should remember that Mr. Besaw won his judicial review of the CDL matter because ITD
failed to have a timely due process hearing. R. at pp.767-768.
Now the IDAPA rules no longer require the thirty day period to get a hearing decision issued.
The Court can note in Bell v. ITD, (2011), supra, noted that the provision from IDAP A Section
39.02.72.600.01 had been removed. The Bell case determined thatthis scheme allows at least three
days for the hearing officer to render the decision before a suspension takes effect. There is no due
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process in these ALS hearings.
In In Re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937,155 PJd 1176 (Ct. App.
2006), the Court of Appeals noted Mr. Gibbar's argument as follows:
"Gibbar argues that the ALS scheme deprive petitioners of procedural due
process because it provides limited discovery, permits use of telephone
hearings, and creates potential oflengthy delays in the administrative process
while a driver's license is suspended, perhaps erroneously. Even assuming
that Gibbar may assert a facial due process challenge ponions of the statute
that did not infringe his own due process rights, Gibbar's general policy
arguments and reliance on other ALS proceedings and statistics outside the
administrative record are inadequate. While it may be true that some
petitioners in ALS hearings may experience unreasonable and prejudicial
delays under the current system, there is no evidence that such circumstance
before us but only counsel's unsubstantiated assertions. The record before
us does not show the ALS statute fails to provide procedural due process on
its face. See Ankney. 109 Idaho at 4-5,704 P.2d at 336-37; McNeely, 119
Idaho at 191, 804 P.2d at p. 920."
At pp. 949 .. 950.
Nowthe Court has Bell v. ITD, 1511daho 659,262 P.3d. 1030 (20ll), to support the concern
explained by Mr. Gibbar. The Bell court focused on subpoenas issued, subpoenas requested, and
discovery in general, similar to the argumenHound in Mr. Gibbar's case. Also, the court expressed
concern on the hearing delay and the decision delay. The Bell cOUl1 stated:
".However, an undue delay in holding a post-suspension hearing or issuing a
decision may constitute a deprivation of due process. Federal Deposit Ins. v.
Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988); Jones v. City of Gary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435,
1444 (7th Cir. 1995); Padberg v. McGarth-McKechnie, 203 F. Supp. 2d 261,
278 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), affd 60 F.App'x 86J (2d Cir. 2003)."
At p. 670.

Mr. Besaw did not have a delay issue regarding the ALS hearing. He had delay issues
regarding the decision being issued. The analysis of due process found in the Bell case certainly can
be applied to Mr. Besaw's case as can the analysis found in Gibbar, supra. Please recall that ALS
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hearing offIcers can not make constitutional decision based on the administrative statutes that apply
to these administrative hearings. IDAPA Rule, 4.11.01.415.

F.
THE STATE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH I.R.C.l1 ., RULE 84
I.R.C.P. , Rule 84(r) states in part:
"These rules shall be construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of all petitions for review."
These cases for judicial review against the state are becoming anything but "just, speedy and
inexpensive" .
I.R.C.P Rule 84f(5) indicates that the clerk of the agency shall prepare the record in
accordance with this rule and lodge it with the agency within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the
petition forjudicial review for the purpose of the settlement of the record in accordance with Rule
84J. ITD failed to do this. This issue was raised below. R. at p. 59. The District Court heard
argument but did not address the issue in it's decision. Motion Hearing Transcript 5-31-2011.
The clerk onTO did not complied with this Rule. The agency did not applied to the district
court for an extension of time. Therefore, the license suspension should be vacated for the violation
of this rule and Mr. Besaw's due process rights.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should remand this matter with an instruction to vacate the license suspension
involving Mr. Besaw's license suspension. His livelihood depends on his CDL license.
DATED this

day of August, 2012.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP

Charles M. Stroschein, a member of the firm
Attorneys for Appellant

I hereby certify on the
day of August, 2012, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
was:
/
Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered to:
--.:t

'--

Edwin L Litteneker
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 321
Lewiston, ID 83501

By _________________________________ _
Attorneys for Appellant
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EXHIBIT A

IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Idaho Transportation Department

IDAPA 39.02.72 - Rules Governing
Administrative License Suspensions
(4-5-00)

801. -- 899.

(RESERVED).

900.
COMMERCIAL DRIVERS.
Ifa person is stopped while driving or in actual physical control ofa commercial motor vehicle (as defined by Section
49-123(2)(c)) and is given an evidentiary test indicating an alcohol concentration of four hundredths (.04) through
seven hundredths (.07) in violation of Section 18-8004b, Idaho Code, the notice of suspension served shall state, in
addition to the information required by Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, that:
(3-19-99)
01.
Class A, B, and C Licenses. Only Class A, B, and C driving privileges shall be suspended, unless
the driver is under twenty-one (21) years then all driving privileges shall be suspended; and
(10-1-94)
02.
Restricted Privileges. A restricted driving permit shall not be issued by the Department for the
(l0-1-94)
operation of commercial vehicles during the term of the suspension.
901. -- 999.

(RESERVED).
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a.
A tape recording of the hearing, except in instances where the Hearing Officer authorizes a
(10-1-94)
different method of reporting the hearing.

b.

Exhibits and other items of evidentiary nature.

(10-1-94)

02.
Requesting Copies. Any party may make a written request for a copy of the tape recording of the
hearing from the Department. The requesting party shall reimburse the Department for the actual cost of providing
the copy.
(10-1-94)
501. -- 599.

(RESERVED).

600.
FINAL ORDER REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION.
The Hearing Officer shall make Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order either sustaining or vacating the
license suspension in question. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order shall be the final order of the
Department. A request for reconsideration must be made within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The request for reconsideration shall contain a request to submit new evidence
if the party wishes the hearing officer to consider any new evidence.
(3-19-99)
01.
Issuing Before Suspension Expiration Date. The Hearing Officer shall issue the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day temporary permit, but failure to do so shall
not be grounds for staying or vacating the suspension.
(10-1-94)
02.
Mailing Final Order. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order is issued when a copy
is deposited in the United States Mail addressed to the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney.
(10-1-94)
601. -- 699.
700.

(RESERVED).

FAILURE

m

APPEAR

01.
Proposed Order of Default. Should the petitioner fail to appear at the scheduled hearing, either in
person or through an attorney, the Hearing Officer shall promptly issue a notice of proposed order of default. This
notice is deemed served when mailed to the petitioner at the address shown in the request for hearing, or ifno address
was provided, the notice shall be mailed to the most current address contained in the petitioner's driver's license
records.
(10-1-94)
02.
Filing Petition. The petitioner may, within seven (7) days of service of the notice of proposed order
of default, file a petition requesting that the order of default not be entered and stating the grounds for such a request.
If the Hearing Officer grants the petitioner's request, the hearing shall be promptly rescheduled. Granting the
petitioner's request shall not stay or vacate the suspension.
(10-1-94)

03.
Denied Petitions. If the Hearing Officer denies the petitioner's request that the default order not be
entered, the Hearing Officer shall make a determination to sustain or vacate the suspension based upon the
documentary record submitted by the Department.
(10-1-94)
04.
Attending a Hearing. A petitioner or witness shall be deemed to have appeared if present within
fifteen (15) minutes after the time the Hearing Officer is ready to begin the hearing. In the case of a telephone
hearing, the petitioner or witness shall be deemed to have appeared if contacted by telephone on the second attempt to
do so within a fifteen (15) minute period from the commencement ofthe hearing.
(3-19-99)
701. -- 799.

(RESERVED).

800.
FORMS.
The Department shall develop appropriate forms to be used throughout the state including, but not limited to, forms
for Notice of Suspension, temporary driving permit, and officer's sworn statement. Each law enforcement agency
shall use the forms supplied by the Department in carrying out the requirements of Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code,
and this Rule. However, the sworn statement may be in the form ofa law enforcement agency's affidavit of probable
cause or equivalent document, so long as it contains the elements required by Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code.
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IDAPA 39
TITLE 02
CHAPTER 72

39.02.72· RULES GOVERNING ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS

000.
LEGAL AUTHORITY.
In accordance with Section IS-S002A, Idaho Code, the Idaho Transportation Board adopts the following rule
governing Administrative License Suspensions (ALS).
(10-1-94)
001.

TITLE AND SCOPE.

01.
Suspensions."

Title. This rule shall be cited as IDAPA 39.02.72, "Rules Governing Administrative License
(4-5-00)

02.
Scope. The purpose of this Rule is to establish driver's license suspension procedures for persons
driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances as indicated by an evidentiary test of blood,
breath, or urine, pursuant to Section IS-S002A, Idaho Code. This rule also includes the procedures for administrative
hearings to review the propriety of administrative license suspensions.
(4-5-00)
002.
WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS.
Written interpretations of this rule in the form of explanatory comments accompanying the rule-making proposal and
a review of the comments submitted during the rule-making process are available from the Secretary to the Board,
Idaho Transportation Board, P.O. Box 7129, Boise, ID S3707-1129, or 3311 W. State Street, Boise, Idaho. (10-1-94)
003.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.
All Administrative License Suspension appeals pursuant to Section IS-S002A, Idaho Code, shall be governed by this
rule and IDAPA 04.11.01, "Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General," in so far as they apply.
(10-1-94)
004. -- 009.
010.

(RESERVED).

DEFINITIONS.

01.
Petitioner. A person who has been served with a Notice of Suspension pursuant to Section ISS002A, Idaho Code.
(10-1-94)
02.
Temporary Permit. A permit to operate a motor vehicle for a period of time not to exceed thirty
(10-1-94)
(30) days from the date of issuance.
03.

a.
Idaho; or

Received by the Department. A document that has been:

(10-1-94)

Personally delivered to the Department's Driver Services Section at 3311 W. State Street, Boise,
(10-1-94)

b.

Delivered by mail and addressed to P.O. Box 7129, Boise, ID S3707-1129; or

(10-1-94)

c.

Transmitted by facsimile machine to telephone number (20S) 334-S739.

(10-1-94)

04.
Business Days. All days of the week except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays as defined by
Section 73-1 OS, Idaho Code.
(10-1-94)
05.
Certified Copy. A reproduction of an original record that has been certified by a custodian of such
record to be a true and accurate copy.
(10-1-94)
06.
same matrix.

Duplicate Original. A counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
(3-19-99)
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07.
Evidentiary Test. An analysis of blood, breath, or urine to determine the presence of alcohol,
drugs, or other intoxicating substances.
(10-1-94)
OIl. -- 099.
100.

(RESERVED).

HEARING REQUESTS.

01.
Written Requests. Hearing requests must be made in writing. Hearing requests must contain the
following information:
(10-1-94)

a.
conducted;

The petitioner's full name, complete mailing address, and telephone number where hearing will be
(3-19-99)

b.

The driver's license number;

(10-1-94)

c.

The petitioner's date of birth;

(10-1-94)

d.

The date of arrest;

(10-1-94)

e.

A brief statement of the issues the petitioner proposes to raise at the hearing; and

(10-1-94)

f.

Any dates or times that the petitioner or attorney cannot be available for the hearing.

(10-1-94)

02.
Timely Requests. Hearing requests must be received by the Department no later than 5 p.m. of the
seventh day following the service of the Notice of Suspension. Hearing requests received after that time shall be
considered untimely. The Department shall deny an untimely hearing request unless the petitioner can demonstrate
(10-1-94)
that a request should be granted.
03.
101.

Request Withdrawal. Petitioners may withdraw their hearing requests at any time.

(10-1-94)

HEARING NOTICES.

01.
Notification. Upon timely receipt of hearing requests, the Department shall notifY petitioners of the
time and date of the hearing as soon as practicable, but no later than seven (7) days prior to the hearing. Hearing
notices shall be mailed to the address provided in the hearing requests, or if no address was provided, notices shall be
mailed to the most current address contained in the petitioner's driver's license records.
(3-19-99)

02.
Hearings Conducted by Telephone. Hearings shall be conducted by telephone unless the hearing
officer shall determine that the petitioner or other participant would be denied the opportunity to participate in the
entire hearing if held by telephone. Face to face hearings shall be held in Ada County (or other locations within the
state as may be determined by the Department).
(3-19-99)
03.
Hearing Date. Hearings shall be conducted within twenty (20) days of receipt of the hearing
request. However, the Hearing Officer may extend the hearing date for an additional ten (10) days upon a showing of
good cause. Such extension shall not stay the suspension nor extend the expiration date of the thirty (30) day
(10-1-94)
temporary permit.
102. -- 199.
200.

(RESERVED).

DOCUMENT SUBMISSION.

01.
Forwarding Documents to the Department. Upon service of a Notice of Suspension, a law
enforcement agency shaH, in accordance with Section IS-S002A, Idaho Code, forward the following documents to
(3-19-99)
the Department within five (5) business days:

a.
Notice of Suspension and Temporary Permit. A temporary permit shall not be issued by a peace
officer when the drivers license is not surrendered, when the drivers license surrendered is not valid, when the driver
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holds a drivers license from another jurisdiction, or when the driver is operating a commercial vehicle at the time of
the stop. No permit will be issued to operate a commercial vehicle.
(3-19-99)
b.
The sworn statement of the officer incorporating any arrest or incident reports relevant to the arrest
and evidentiary testing.
(10-1-94)
c.
A certified copy or duplicate original of the test results or log of test results if the officer has
directed an evidentiary test of the petitioner's breath.
(3-19-99)
d.

The operational checklist for the administration of breath tests, if used.

(10-1-94)

e.

The petitioner's driver's license, if the petitioner is an Idaho licensed driver.

(10-1-94)

02.
Compliance. The documents shall be considered forwarded in a timely manner if they are
postmarked within five (5) business days of the date of service of the Notice of Suspension or are accompanied by a
certificate, certifying the documents were deposited with:
(3-19-99)

a.

The United States mail or overnight delivery service; or

b.

Hand delivered, within five (5) business days of the date of service of the suspension notice.
(3-19-99)

(10-1-94)

03.
Blood and Urine Tests. If an evidentiary test of blood or urine was administered rather than a
breath test, the Notice of Suspension shall not be served until the results of the test are obtained. In such cases, the
peace officer may forward the sworn statement and accompanying reports to the Department and the Department
(10-1-94)
shall have the responsibility of serving the Notice of Suspension, if necessary.
201. -- 299.
300.

(RESERVED).

SUBPOENAS.

01.
Request. The Hearing Officer assigned to the matter may, upon written request, issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary or tangible evidence at a hearing. (10-1-94)
02.
Serving Subpoenas. Parties requesting subpoenas shall be responsible for having the subpoenas
served. Witnesses shall not be compelled to attend and testifY at hearings unless served with subpoenas at least
(10-1-94)
seventy-two (72) hours prior to the time of hearing.
301. -- 399.
400.

(RESERVED).

DOCUMENT DISCOVERY.

01.
Obtaining Photocopies. To obtain a photocopy of a document which is public record, relates to the
petitioner hearing, and is in the possession of the Department, petitioners shall make a written request to the
Department. The Department shall attempt to provide the requested copies prior to the hearing date, but failure to do
so shall not be grounds for staying or rescinding a suspension.
(10-1-94)
02.
Further Document Discovery. Further discovery shall only be conducted in accordance with
IDAPA 04.11.01.521, "Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General."
(10-1-94)
401. -- 499.
500.

(RESERVED).

RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS.

01.
shall consist of:

Required Records. The Hearing Officer shall make a record of hearing proceedings. This record
(10-1-94)
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EXHIBITB

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NON-CMV IMPLIED CONSENT ADVISORY
(Operation of non-commercial motor vehicles only)

A. You are under arrest for: (check appropriate offense)
D
D

Driving (or being in actual physical control of) a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (and/or drugs).
Being under 21 years of age and driving (or being in actual physical control of) a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .02 or
more.

- ORB. I have probable cause to believe that you were driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle, and: (check appropriate circumstance)
D
D

Were under the influence of alcohol (and/or drugs) in violation of MCA 61-8-401 and the vehicle you were driving was involved in a motor
vehicle accident resulting in property damage.
Were involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury or death.

Under Montana law, a person in your situation is deemed to have given his or her implied consent to testing for alcohol and possibly testing for
drugs.
As the requesting officer, I have the right to select the type of test or tests you will be asked to take.
blood) test. (Later I may ask you to take a blood test.)

I am going to ask you to take a breath (or

(1)

You must decide to take or refuse this test without talking to an attorney. Your right to an attorney under Miranda does not apply.

(2)

IF DRIVER IS UNLICENSED OR HOLDS A BASE DRIVER LICENSE (ONLY NON-CMV DRIVING PRIVILEGES):
If you refuse this test, your driver license (if any) will be seized and your driver license, driving privilege and/or privilege to apply for and be
issued a driver license will be suspended for six months.
If you have refused similar testing within the past five years and you refuse again tOday, your driver license will be seized and your
privilege to drive and/or apply for and be issued a driver license will be suspended for one year.

(3)

IF DRIVER HOLDS A COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE (CDL): In addition to any actions taken against your non-commercial driving
privileges, as the holder of a commercial driver license:
If you refuse this test, your commercial driver license will be seized and suspended for one year.
If you have refused similar testing in the past or have a prior major offense on your driving record and you refuse testing today, your
commercial driver license will be seized and suspended for life.

(4)

If you have a driver license issued by another jurisdiction and you refuse to take this test, your non-resident driving privileges in Montana
and/or your privilege to apply for and be issued a driver license will be suspended for a minimum of six months to a maximum of life,
depending on the class of license that you are holding (non-CDL or CDL) and your current driving record, plus your license will be seized
and returned to the licensing agency of your home jurisdiction along with a report of your testing refusal.

(5)

You will not be eligible for a probationary driver license during the suspension.

(6)

If you refuse testing, you may contest the action taken against your license by filing a petition in a Montana District Court. The action will
not be overturned unless you prove that your arrest or the investigatory stop was unlawful or that you did not refuse testing. You may ask
the court to restore your driving privileges until the court rules on your petition.

(7)

Your test results or testing refusal may be used as evidence in a criminal trial. Additionally, if you refuse testing today, the jury (or judge
in a non-jury trial) may infer from your refusal that you were under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. The inference is rebuttable.

(8)

After the requested testing is completed or refused, you may have a doctor or nurse administer an independent blood test for alcohol or
drugs at your expense. If you refuse testing now, taking an independent test will not change the action taken on your driver license.

A breath test requires you to blow a proper sample of air into this instrument. It will analyze your breath sample for alcohol concentration.
you take a breath test?
Yes
No

----

This advisory was read on

to:

Name
Advising Officer's Signature
Date of Birth
Commercial Driver License:
Commercial Motor Vehicle:

Driver License Number
Witness Signature - Optional
TO BE RETAINED BY OFFICER FOR FUTURE REFERENCE

36-0300 05/08

DYes
DYes

0
0

No
No

Will

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CMV IMPLIED CONSENT ADVISORY
(Operation of commercial motor vehicles only)
YOU ARE ADVISED THAT:
As a peace officer for the State of Montana,
a.

I have reasonable grounds to believe that you have been driving or in actual physical control of a commercial motor
vehicle upon the ways of the state open to the public while having a detectable or measurable alcohol concentration in
your body.

b.

You must decide to take or refuse this test without talking to an attorney. Your right to an attorney under Miranda does not
apply.

c.

I have the right to select the type of test you will be asked to take. At the end of this advisory I will ask you to take a breath
(alternately, blood) test.

d.

If you refuse to submit to the test as requested, or your test result indicates an alcohol content of .04 or greater, I will
immediately seize your driver license and issue you a notice of suspension of your commercial driver license and/or
commercial motor vehicle driving privileges, upon behalf of the Montana Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division.

e.

Your commercial driver license, commercial motor vehicle driving privileges, and/or eligibility to apply for and be issued a
commercial driver license will be suspended for:
a. One year for a first-time refusal or a .04 alcohol violation involving non-placardable vehicle cargo;
b. Three years for a first-time refusal or a .04 alcohol violation involving placardable vehicle cargo; or
c. Life, if you have a prior testing refusal in either a commercial or a non-commercial motor vehicle, a prior .04
alcohol violation in a commercial motor vehicle, or a prior conviction for major offense, as defined under Mont.
Code Ann. § 61-8-802, subsection (2), on your driving record.

f.

During the period of suspension, you will not be eligible for any probationary or work-related commercial motor vehicle
driving privileges.

g.

You may contest any suspension of your commercial driver license and/or commercial motor vehicle driving privileges by
filing a petition in district court. In court you will have to prove that the suspension action was unlawful. You may also ask
the court to restore your commercial driving privileges until the court rules on your petition.

h.

Your test results or testing refusal may be used as evidence against you in a criminal trial. Additionally, if you refuse
testing today, the jury (or judge in a non-jury trial) may infer from your refusal that you were under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs in a criminal trial. The inference is rebuttable.

i.

After the requested testing is completed or refused, you may have a doctor or nurse administer an independent blood test
for alcohol or drugs at your expense. If you refuse testing now, taking an independent test will not change the action taken
against your driver license.

YOU ARE FURTHER ADVISED THAT YOU WILL BE DECLARED OUT-OF-SERVICE for a period of 24 hours if you have a
measurable amount or detectable presence of alcohol in your body.
A breath test requires you to blow a proper sample of air into this instrument. It will analyze your breath sample for alcohol
Yes
No_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
concentration. Will you take a breath test?
This advisory was read on

~______--__----------------~------- to:
Date

Time

Driver's Name
Address
City/State _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Driver License Number

36-0200-05/08

State

Advising Officer's Signature

Commercial Driver License:
Commercial Motor Vehicle:

To be retained by officer for future reference

DYes
DYes

D No
D No

p.3

WASHINGTON STATE

OUI ARREST REPORT
CASE I CITAnON NI"NBER

Co g

,)17.g

1

IMPLIED CONSENT WARNING FOR BREATH
WARNJNG! YOU' ARE UNDER ARREST FOR:
(check appropriate boxies])

'KI

RCW 46.61.502 OR 'RCW 46.61.504: Driving or being in actual physical control of a molor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor andfor drugs.

o

RCW 4£.61.503; Being under 21 years of age and driving or being in actual physlcal control of a motor 119hicle after consuming alcohol.

o

RCW 46.25.110; Driving a commercial motor vehicle while having alcohol in your system.

FURTHER. YOU ARE NOW BEING ASKED TO SUBMIT TO A TEST OF YOUR BREATH WHICH CONSISTS OF TWO SEPARATE SAMPLES OF YOUR BREATH, TAKEN
INDEPENDENTLY. TO 'DETERMINE ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION.
,.

YOU ARE NOW ADVISED THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ,.HIS BREATH TE.ST; AND THAT IF YOU REFUSE:
(A)
(S)

2.

YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE. P::RMIT, OR PRMLEGE TO DRIVE WILL BE REVOKED OR DENIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING FOR AT LEAST ONE
yEAR: AND
YOUR REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THIS TEST MAY BE USED IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL.

YOU ARE FURTHER ADVISED THAT IF YOU SUBMIT,.O THIS BREATH TEST , AND THE TEST IS ADMINISTERED. YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE. PERMIT. OR
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE WILL BE SUSPENDED. REVOKED. OR DENIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING FOR AT LEAST NINETY DAYS IF YOU ARE :
AGE TWENTY-ONE OR OVER AND THE TEST INDICATES THE ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION OF YOUR BREATH IS 0.08 OR MORE. 0~ You ARE IN
VIOLATION OF RCW 46.61.502. DRMNG UNDER THE INFLUENCE. OR ROO 46.61.504. PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE;
OR
(B) UNDER AGE 1WENTY-ONE AND THE TEST INDICATES THE ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION OF YOUR BREATH IS 0.02 OR MORE. OR YOU ARE IN
VIOLATION OF ~CW 46.61.502. DRIVING UNDER THE INFlUENCE. OR RCW 46.61 .504, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENGE.

(A)

3.

IF YOUR DRIVER'S UCENSE. PERMIT. OR PRIVILEGE TO ORIVE IS SUSPENDED. REVOKED. OR DENIED. YOU MAY BE ELIGiBlE TO IMMEOIA TELY APPLY
FOR AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DRIVER'S LICENSE.

4.

YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO ADDITtONAL TESTS ADlAlNISTERED BY ANY QUAliFIED PERSON OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING.

FOR THOSE HOT DRIVING A COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE AT THE TIME OF ARREST: IF YOUR DRIVER'S UCENSE IS SUSPENDED OR REVOKED, YOUR
COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE, IF ANY, WILL BE DISQUALIFIED.
FOR THOSE DRMNG A COMME.RCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE AT THE TIME OF ARREST: IF YOU EITHER (A) REFUSE THIS TEST OR (B) SUBMIT TO THIS TEST AND
THE TEST INDI CATES AN ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION OF 0.04 OR MORE, YOll WilL BE DISQUAUFIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING FROM DRIVING A
COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE.

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

&-2 -II
DATEfTlME
WILL YOU NOW SUBMIT TO A BREATH TEST?
Did subject express any confusion regarding the
implied consent warnings? If yes, explain below.

o

YES

~NO

. At the time of this test(s), I was certified to operate the BAC DATAMASTER, the BAC DATAMASTER CDM, and PBT and possessed a valid permit
issued by the State ToxicologiSt.
DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN
SUBSTANCE IN YOUR MOUTH"?

D

YES

NO

MOUTH CHECKED?
TIME?

23"2 '8

'YES

0

NO

2 MOUTH CHECK? (If r·:·~c;:O~~;"Jry )
TIME?

ANY FOREIGN SUBSTANCES FOUND?

o

REMOVED

NJ

YES

NO

DYES

ONO

0

0

YES

EXPLAIN:

NO

~ I observed Ihe subject from the time of the mouth check through the completion of the breath test.

{J

The subject did not vomit. eat, drink. smoke. or place any foreign substance in his/her mouth during the observation time.

tAl. I performed the PBT test in accordance wit

7J (Chapter 448-15 WAC}
~OOKED

pro1fol&

PA E ~T

READING "'Z...

,

I

£.j .J

P8T TIME

Z'3 GO

RELEASED TO:

OPR'O
3OO()..11C-195 R(RIW. 1109)
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